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Influenza A subtype H7 viruses have resulted in >100 
cases of human infection since 2002 in the Netherlands, Italy, 
Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Clinical 
illness from subtype H7 infection ranges from conjunctivitis 
to mild upper respiratory illness to pneumonia. Although sub-
type H7 infections have resulted in a smaller proportion of 
hospitalizations and deaths in humans than those caused by 
subtype H5N1, some subtype H7 strains appear more adapt-
ed for human infection on the basis of their virus-binding 
properties and illness rates among exposed persons. More-
over, increased isolation of subtype H7 influenza viruses from 
poultry and the ability of this subtype to cause severe human 
disease underscore the need for continued surveillance and 
characterization of these viruses. We review the history of 
human infection caused by subtype H7. In addition, we dis-
cuss recently identified molecular correlates of subtype H7 
virus pathogenesis and assess current measures to prevent 
future subtype H7 virus infection.
I
nfluenza A viruses belong to the family Orthomyxoviridae 
and  possess  8  negative-sense  RNA  segments  encoding 
11 known proteins. Of these, the 2 viral surface glycopro-
teins, hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA), form 
the basis of multiple serologically distinct virus subtypes. 
Currently, 16 HA and 9 NA subtypes have been identified 
in wild water birds, the natural host for all influenza A vi-
ruses and the reservoir from which viruses emerge to infect 
domestic  poultry  and  occasionally  mammals.  Most  influ-
enza viruses that infect wild or domestic birds cause no or 
limited illnesses and deaths and are characterized as being 
low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) viruses. However,   
viruses within the H5 and H7 subtypes have the capacity to 
acquire genetic properties that confer high virulence and a 
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high proportion of deaths in chickens and other fowl after 
their introduction into domestic poultry; these viruses are 
characterized as highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) 
viruses  according  to  the  intravenous  pathogenicity  index 
method described by the World Organization for Animal 
Health (1). LPAI viruses (H9N2) are also prevalent in poul-
try in many countries and are considered to have pandemic 
potential (2). Domesticated birds may serve as important in-
termediate hosts for the transmission of wild bird influenza 
viruses to humans, as may swine, as evidenced by recent 
human infections with swine influenza virus A (H1N1) on 
multiple continents. In April 2009, the World Health Organi-
zation (WHO) reported human illness caused by a new strain 
of swine influenza virus subtype H1N1; infections were soon 
confirmed in 7 countries. As of April 28, 2009, Mexico had 
reported the highest number of subtype H1N1 cases, with 26 
confirmed human cases of infection and 7 deaths.
If an influenza virus with an HA against which the 
human population had little or no immunity crossed the 
species barrier and was efficiently transmitted among hu-
mans, a pandemic could result. Three pandemics occurred 
in the 20th century: in 1918 (H1N1), 1957 (H2N2), and 
1968 (H3N2). However, none of these pandemic strains 
possessed the HA cleavage site mutation characteristic of 
HPAI viruses (3). Thus, the HPAI phenotype is not required 
for an influenza virus to cause a pandemic. Three HA sub-
types, H1–H3, subsequently established stable lineages in 
humans; 2 subtypes, H1N1 and H3N2, cause seasonal epi-
demics today, which result in ≈36,000 deaths in the United 
States annually (4). Although the severity of a pandemic 
virus cannot be known in advance, attack rates could reach 
25%–35%. The resulting surge in the number of persons 
requiring medical or hospital treatment would undoubtedly 
overwhelm the healthcare system.
Within the past decade, HPAI and LPAI viruses have 
been found to be associated with human infection, primar-
ily as a result of direct transmission from poultry to humans 
(2,5,6). However, none of these viruses have yet acquired the 
ability to be transmitted efficiently among humans. LPAI vi-
ruses of the H7 and H9 subtypes have caused mild respiratory 
or conjunctival infections in humans. However, some HPAI 
subtype H5 and H7 viruses, which cause a high proportion 
of deaths in experimentally infected chickens, have been as-
sociated with severe human disease and death (5,6). Due to 
an unprecedented geographic expansion of subtype H5N1 
viruses since 2003 and continued sporadic human subtype 
H5N1 infections, much emphasis has been placed on the po-
tential pandemic threat posed by subtype H5N1 viruses. In 
contrast, subtype H7 infection in humans has not been as 
extensively studied. In this perspective, we will discuss the 
epidemiology of subtype H7 in humans, current research that 
explores the pandemic potential of these viruses, and ongo-
ing measures to prevent future human infection.
Prevalence of Subtype H7 Influenza Viruses 
in Poultry and Risk for Human Infection
Subtype  H7  influenza  viruses,  like  avian  influenza 
viruses of all subtypes, fall into 2 geographically distinct 
genetic lineages, North American or Eurasian (7). Viruses 
within both lineages have been associated with human in-
fection (Table). In recent years, poultry outbreaks caused 
by HPAI and LPAI viruses of the H7N1, H7N2, H7N3, 
H7N4, and H7N7 subtypes have resulted in the culling of 
>75 million birds (18). Notably, the geographic diversity of 
countries affected by the H7 subtype in poultry, which in-
cludes Pakistan, Australia, Ireland, Italy, Canada, Germa-
ny, Chile, the Netherlands, and the United States, readily 
demonstrates the global public health risk posed by viruses 
within this subtype (18).
Before 2003, reports of subtype H7 infection in hu-
mans were rare and primarily resulted from laboratory or 
occupational exposure. One exception was the first docu-
mented isolation of a fowl plague-like virus (FPV; HPAI 
viruses of the H7N7 subtype) from a human, which oc-
curred in the United States in 1959, from the blood of a 
man with clinically diagnosed infectious hepatitis (19,20). 
In 1977, a laboratory technician became infected through 
accidentally splashing allantoic fluid containing FPV on 
her face, which resulted in conjunctival symptoms (21). 
During the winter of 1979–80, a virus antigenically simi-
lar to A/fowl plague/Dutch/27 (H7N7) caused the deaths 
of  ≈500  seals  on  the  New  England  coast.  Subsequent 
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Table. Cases of human subtype H7 influenza A virus infection since 1996* 
Location Year  Subtype  IVPI
No. human 
infections Symptoms  References
UK (England)  1996 H7N7 LPAI 1 Conjunctivitis (8,9)
USA (Virginia)  2002 H7N2 LPAI 1† Respiratory  (10)
USA (New York)  2003 H7N2 LPAI 1 Respiratory  (11)
Italy  2002–03 H7N3 LPAI 7† Conjunctivitis, respiratory  (12)
The Netherlands  2003 H7N7 HPAI 89 Conjunctivitis, respiratory  (6,13)
Canada (British Columbia)  2004 H7N3 LPAI/HPAI 2 Conjunctivitis, respiratory  (14,15)
UK (Norfolk)  2006 H7N3 LPAI 1 Conjunctivitis (16)
UK (Wales)  2007 H7N2 LPAI 4 Conjunctivitis, respiratory  (17)
*IVPI, intravenous pathogenicity index (1); LPAI, low pathogenicity avian influenza; HPAI, highly pathogenic avian influenza. 
†Serologic evidence only.  Influenza Virus A Subtype H7 Infection
study  of  the  prototype  virus  A/seal/Massachusetts/1/80 
(H7N7) resulted in the infection of a laboratory worker 
when  an  experimentally  infected  seal  sneezed  into  the 
face and the right eye of the worker (22,23). Four persons 
who conducted necropsies of infected seals also contract-
ed conjunctivitis within 2 days of known ocular exposure; 
although the virus was not isolated from the 4 field work-
ers, clinical signs and duration of illness were consistent 
with subtype H7N7 virus infection (22).
The first reported case of direct transmission of a sub-
type H7 virus from an avian to a human host occurred in 
1996, when conjunctivitis developed in a woman who kept 
pet ducks 1 day after she experienced a possible eye abra-
sion while cleaning her duck house (8,9). A conjunctival 
swab from this patient was found to be positive for an in-
fluenza virus A (H7N7), A/England/268/96, which was de-
termined to be wholly avian in origin by sequence analysis 
(9). However, a rise in serum hemagglutination inhibition 
(HI) titer to virus postexposure was not detected in any 
of these early human infections. It is not known whether 
the absence of HI antibody detected in serum specimens 
from these infected persons was due to an actual lack of 
induction of serum antibodies after infection with these H7 
subtypes or whether the relative insensitivity of the avian 
erythrocyte-based HI assay used at that time contributed 
to these findings. Nevertheless, these initial events clearly 
confirmed the ability for interspecies transmission of sub-
type H7 viruses to humans.
Recent Human Infections with  
Subtype H7 Influenza A Viruses
In contrast to these isolated instances of human infec-
tion with subtype H7 viruses, numerous outbreaks of LPAI 
and HPAI viruses of this type among poultry since 2000 
have  resulted  in  increased  numbers  of  human  exposure 
and infection (Table). This increase in detection may be 
a result of a combination of several factors: more human 
infections, improved PCR diagnostic testing, heightened 
awareness of the risk for avian influenza in humans caused 
by subtype H5N1, and increased surveillance and testing of 
humans exposed to avian influenza. The largest outbreak 
of subtype H7 infections in humans to date occurred in the 
spring of 2003, when an HPAI (H7N7) virus was detected 
in commercial poultry farms in the Netherlands and neces-
sitated the culling of >30 million birds (6,13). All internal 
genes of this virus were of avian origin and were found 
to be related to low pathogenicity viruses detected during 
surveillance of ducks in the region in 2000 (13). Eighty-
six persons involved in the culling operation and 3 of their 
family members who had not been in contact with infected 
poultry  had  virologically  confirmed  subtype  H7  illness, 
which  suggests  that  limited  human-to-human  transmis-
sion of the avian virus also had occurred (6). Among these 
persons, 78 had conjunctivitis, 5 had conjunctivitis and re-
spiratory symptoms, 2 had respiratory symptoms only, and 
1 died (6), a veterinarian who had visited several infected 
farms and in whom an acute respiratory distress syndrome 
and pneumonia developed. The virus isolated from a post-
mortem lung specimen of the patient with the fatal case,   
A/NL/219/2003, differed by 14 aa residues across 5 gene 
segments from a virus isolated from a chicken on the index 
farm, A/ck/NL/1/2003 (6). Serologic studies have provided 
further evidence of human infection during this outbreak 
(24). The number of human illnesses in this outbreak is 
in stark contrast to outbreaks of subtype H5N1 infection; 
most human cases of influenza virus A (H5N1) have oc-
curred as isolated cases or small clusters of <3 cases with a 
maximum of 8 persons clinically ill (5).
In addition to the HPAI (H7N7) outbreak in the Neth-
erlands, LPAI (H7N3) viruses caused outbreaks in poultry 
in northern Italy during 2002–03. Retrospective serologic 
analysis of workers involved in the outbreak response iden-
tified 7 of 185 persons who had close direct physical contact 
with poultry and were seropositive by microneutralization 
assay and Western blot analysis for subtype H7 influenza 
(12). One of these persons reported conjunctival symptoms 
during the outbreak. However, seroreactivity was not de-
tected in workers involved in the earlier outbreak responses 
to LPAI and HPAI viruses (H7N1) that caused multiple 
poultry outbreaks in Italy from 1999–2001, which suggests 
either a different level of human exposure to subtype H7N1 
viruses or differing abilities of subtype H7 viruses to trans-
mit to humans (12).
HPAI and LPAI subtype H7 viruses have also caused 
poultry  outbreaks  and  economic  loss  in  the  Americas. 
LPAI viruses (H7N2) have circulated in the northeastern 
United States live bird markets for over a decade and were 
the cause of a devastating outbreak predominantly on do-
mestic turkey farms in 2002. One of 80 tested workers in-
volved in the culling operations during this outbreak re-
ported a temporally related respiratory illness and exhibited 
serum-neutralizing  antibody  responses  consistent  with  a 
subtype H7N2 virus infection, providing the first evidence 
of possible human infection with a North American lin-
eage LPAI virus (H7N2) (10). One year later, an immuno-
compromised New York resident with a fever and cough 
sought treatment at a hospital, and a subtype H7N2 virus, 
A/NY/107/2003 (NY/107), was subsequently isolated from 
a respiratory specimen (11). The HA gene of NY/107 virus 
exhibits 98% aa sequence identity with a representative vi-
rus from the 2002 outbreak in Virginia, A/tky/VA/4529/02 
(25). The person recovered from the respiratory illness and 
demonstrated seroconversion to subtype H7N2 (NY/107) 
virus, but the source of his initial exposure to the avian 
virus remains unknown. LPAI virus (H7N2) was isolated 
from 133 of 4,675 poultry specimens from New York, and 
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1 of 3,406 specimens from New Jersey in early 2006, but 
this subtype has not been detected among domestic poultry 
in the United States since March 2006 (26).
HPAI subtype H7 viruses again caused human disease 
in North America, as observed in Spring 2004 during an 
outbreak of subtype H7N3 infection in poultry in British 
Columbia, Canada. The initial virus was an LPAI virus that 
subsequently became HPAI by acquisition of a 7-aa M1 
gene sequence insertion at the HA cleavage site through a 
nonhomologous recombination event (14). Among work-
ers associated with the outbreak response, 57 suspected hu-
man cases of subtype H7N3 infection were reported due 
to  conjunctival  or  influenza-like  illness  symptoms  (15). 
In 2 of these persons, who were involved in the culling of 
infected birds, conjunctivitis developed after direct ocular 
exposure to infected poultry after a breach in eye protec-
tion. Influenza virus A (H7N3) was isolated from a nasal 
specimen from 1 person with conjunctivitis and coryza, A/
Canada/444/2004 (Can/444), and another from a conjuncti-
val specimen from the other person who exhibited conjunc-
tivitis and headache, A/Canada/504/2004 (Can/504); both 
persons recovered fully (15). Although both human isolates 
contained the 7-aa M1 gene sequence insertion, an intrave-
nous pathogenicity index test determined that Can/504 was 
HPAI, whereas Can/444 was not (14). Notably, the emer-
gence of HPAI from LPAI viruses by nonhomologous re-
combination has been reported with both North American 
and Eurasian lineage subtype H7 viruses, but not viruses 
within the H5 subtype (14,27).
Most recently, multiple H7 viruses have resulted in 
cases of human infection in the United Kingdom. In 2006, 
an LPAI virus (H7N3) first detected in a poultry flock in 
eastern England was isolated from a poultry worker with 
conjunctivitis  (16).  Four  additional  persons  associated 
with  the  outbreak  later  presented  with  conjunctivitis  or 
influenza-like  illness,  but  all  symptomatic  persons  were 
PCR negative for influenza (16). In 2007, poultry infected 
with LPAI (H7N2) were sold from a small market in the 
United Kingdom and resulted in 4 persons with confirmed 
cases of H7 human infection, 3 of whom were hospital-
ized for 3–7 days, and 19 additional symptomatic persons 
for whom PCR results were negative (17). Those exposed 
to the virus reported both conjunctivitis and influenza-like 
illness;  one  of  the  hospitalized  patients  had  neurologic 
and gastrointestinal symptoms, but not respiratory disease 
(28). The increased frequency of human infection with H7 
viruses in recent years, coupled with the continued detec-
tion of H7 influenza viruses in poultry in both Europe and 
North America, suggests that future human infections with 
viruses within this subtype are likely to occur.
Surprisingly, seroconversion for neutralizing antibody 
has rarely been observed among persons with virologically 
confirmed subtype H7 infection. For example, neutralizing 
antibody responses were not detected in persons confirmed 
to be infected with the HPAI virus (H7N7) in 2003 (24). 
Likewise,  neutralizing  antibody  titers  were  not  detected 
in convalescent-phase serum from any person exposed to 
infected birds during the 2004 subtype H7N3 outbreak in 
Canada, including those with confirmed cases with posi-
tive virus isolation (15,29). In contrast, infection with LPAI 
(H7N2) that resulted in respiratory illness in the United 
States did induce a detectable serum-neutralizing antibody 
response (10). Low antibody levels also were detected in a 
person who was infected with an LPAI virus (H7N3) (30). 
However, the optimal methods of detecting antibody and 
criteria for seropositivity to H7 virus in humans remain 
unclear;  current  criteria  used  are  those  established  and 
adapted by WHO for H5N1 subtype human infection and 
extrapolated for the H7 subtype. In addition to evaluating 
potential avian subtype-specific differences in the detection 
of neutralizing antibodies, further study is needed to ascer-
tain whether conjunctival avian virus infection routinely 
leads to detectable serum antibodies. Sensitive and specific 
methods of detecting mucosal antibody to influenza virus 
in ocular specimens are also needed.
Properties of Subtype H7 Influenza Viruses
Because  of  the  sustained  frequency  of  epornitics 
caused  by  influenza  virus  subtype  H5N1  that  have  re-
sulted in human infections during the past 5 years, viruses 
within  this  subtype  are  rightly  considered  a  major  pan-
demic threat. However, subtype H7 influenza viruses share 
many properties with viruses within the H5 subtype, and 
H7 outbreaks involving large numbers of infected persons 
have been documented. Thus, the pandemic potential of 
subtype H7 viruses should not be underestimated because 
viruses within this subtype have caused severe human in-
fection and death, with limited human-to-human transmis-
sion (Figure) (5,13). Interestingly, although subtype H5N1 
infection most frequently manifests as severe respiratory 
disease, human infection with subtype H7 viruses predomi-
nantly result in conjunctivital symptoms with occasional 
and generally mild respiratory illness. Despite the overall 
differences in human disease manifestations and severity, 
subtype H7 viruses can replicate efficiently in the respira-
tory tract of experimentally infected animals without the 
need for prior adaptation, and have the capacity to spread 
systemically, including to the central nervous system, in 
mammalian models (31,32).
North American lineage subtype H7 viruses, despite 
exhibiting  reduced  virulence  in  mammalian  models  as 
compared with subtype H7 viruses from the Eurasian lin-
eage, nonetheless possess multiple features that underscore 
the public health threat posed by these viruses. This is espe-
cially apparent for the North American lineage LPAI virus-
es (H7N2), which circulated in the live bird markets of the 
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northeastern United States for over a decade. These viruses 
possess a 24-nt deletion found in the HA and a 51-nt stalk 
deletion in the NA, which distinguishes them from other 
subtype  H7  viruses  found  in  domestic  poultry  in  North 
America. Since these viruses were introduced in 1994, the 
HA cleavage site of circulating viruses acquired additional 
basic amino acids, a known correlate of pathogenicity for 
avian influenza viruses (33).
Recent  work  has  also  identified  that  contemporary 
North American lineage subtype H7 viruses, isolated in 
2002–03, are partially adapted to recognize α2–6 linked 
sialic acids, which are the receptors preferred by human 
influenza viruses and found in the human upper respira-
tory tract (34). A critical determinant for viral transmission 
among humans believed to be the binding between the vi-
rus and sialic acid receptors located on cells in the upper 
airway. Therefore, if North American lineage subtype H7 
viruses adapt further to enhance their ability to bind solely 
to α2–6 linked sialic acid receptors, these avian influenza 
viruses could have the potential to spread more efficient-
ly  from  birds  to  humans  and  among  humans.  Although 
human-to-human transmission has not been documented 
among North American lineage subtype H7 influenza vi-
ruses, the discovery of an LPAI virus (H7N2) isolated from 
a human in 2003 that was transmissible by direct contact in 
ferrets identifies the potential of viruses within this lineage 
to acquire this property (34). In contrast, most avian influ-
enza viruses tested in this manner fail to transmit. Human 
influenza viruses are thought to be transmitted primarily by 
respiratory droplets expelled during coughing or sneezing; 
no avian viruses of subtype H5 or H7 have yet demonstrat-
ed the ability to spread through respiratory droplets in the 
ferret transmission model.
In comparison with the generally mild infections ob-
served with either HPAI or LPAI North American lineage 
subtype H7 viruses, HPAI (H7N7) European lineage virus-
es isolated from humans resemble subtype H5N1 viruses 
in their capacity for high virulence in mammalian models 
(31,32). Eurasian lineage subtype H5N1 viruses have been 
found to be more virulent in the mouse model than non-
Eurasian lineage subtype H5N1 viruses; however, no mo-
lecular determinants have been associated with the hypoth-
esis that Eurasian lineage avian influenza viruses are more 
capable of infecting mammals (35). Nevertheless, selected 
subtype  H7  viruses  within  the  Eurasian  lineage  possess 
molecular features (such as the E627K PB2 substitution) 
most frequently found in highly pathogenic subtype H5N1 
viruses in poultry and, additionally, resemble highly patho-
genic subtype H5N1 viruses with regard to the preservation 
of an avian receptor-binding preference and a general in-
ability to transmit efficiently in the ferret model (34,36).
Despite >400 confirmed human cases of subtype H5 
infection since 1997, all infections have resulted from vi-
ruses possessing the N1 NA subtype (5). In contrast, sub-
type H7 viruses with multiple NA subtypes have success-
fully transmitted from birds to humans, suggesting that 
multiple NA subtypes are compatible with the subtype H7 
HA. Although subtype H5N1 viruses associated with dis-
ease in humans have predominantly been HPAI viruses 
from the Eurasian lineage, both lineages of subtype H7 
viruses have been associated with disease in humans. The 
great diversity of subtype H7 viruses associated with dis-
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Figure.  Public  health  impact  of  influenza  virus A 
subtypes H7 and H5. HPAI, highly pathogenic avian 
influenza; LPAI, low pathogenicity avian influenza; 
LBM, live bird market.PERSPECTIVE
ease in humans supports the need for active surveillance 
for illness among persons exposed to subtype H7 viruses, 
including farm workers, cullers, and the families of these 
workers, as well as healthcare providers who care for ill 
persons involved in subtype H7 outbreaks. The occur-
rence of conjunctival symptoms after infection with sub-
type H7 viruses, a clinical sign of illness not frequently 
associated with infection with other virus subtypes, fur-
ther demonstrates the complexity of this virus subtype; 
research investigating the ocular tropism of selected in-
fluenza viruses is needed to better understand and protect 
humans from this possible route of virus entry.
Preventing Subtype H7 Virus Infection in Humans
Although  effective  vaccines  offer  the  best  protec-
tion against avian influenza viruses, technical limitations 
currently prevent the rapid generation and availability of 
a  strain-specific  vaccine  against  an  emerging  pandemic 
virus.  The  emergence  of  multiple  antigenically  distinct 
virus  clades,  resulting  in  a  need  for  clade-specific  vac-
cine candidates, has posed a substantial challenge for the 
design of subtype H5N1 virus vaccines (5). The genera-
tion of subtype H7 vaccine candidates faces similar chal-
lenges because antigenically distinct subtype H7 lineages 
have resulted in human disease, and the isolation of North 
American lineage subtypes H7N2, H7N3, and Eurasian lin-
eage H7N7 and H7N3 viruses from humans in recent years 
identifies multiple distinct H7 subtypes that may warrant 
the development of appropriate vaccine candidates. Vac-
cination of poultry has been successful in controlling of 
subtype H7 influenza (18); vaccines for human use against 
both lineages of H7 influenza are under development and 
have been evaluated in preclinical studies (25,32,37).
Antiviral strategies that are effective against influenza 
viruses of multiple subtypes will be an important first line 
of defense in the event of a pandemic. Unfortunately, the 
emergence of antiviral-resistant subtype H5 and H7 influ-
enza viruses has been documented. Viruses from the 2003 
Netherlands outbreak were found to be sensitive to the NA 
inhibitors oseltamivir and zanamivir in vitro but resistant 
to the M2 ion-channel blocker amantadine both in vitro and 
in a mouse model (13,38). Amantadine-resistant variants 
have also been observed among subtype H7 viruses within 
the North American lineage (39). Together with the detec-
tion of subtype H5N1 viruses with reduced susceptibility 
to antiviral agents (5), these findings underscore the im-
portance of surveillance for resistant viruses of avian influ-
enza virus of multiple subtypes as well as the generation of 
novel antiviral strategies to combat influenza viruses of an 
unknown subtype.
In addition to pharmacologic interventions, the cor-
rect use of personal protective equipment during possible 
virus exposure should be emphasized. The frequency of 
conjunctival symptoms after subtype H7 virus exposure 
underscores the importance of protecting the ocular surface 
from possible abrasion and virus entry; eye protection is 
recommended for all persons during possible exposure to 
avian influenza viruses (40). Given the potential for human 
infection, active monitoring for illness and for adherence 
to appropriate use of personal protective equipment among 
all persons potentially exposed to subtype H7 viruses dur-
ing outbreaks in poultry should be conducted, and testing 
should be readily available should illnesses occur.
Subtype H5N1 viruses are now endemic in countries in 
Asia and Africa, and subtype H7 viruses continue to circu-
late across Europe and North America, as demonstrated by 
the detection of subtype H7 influenza viruses in chickens 
in Arkansas and the United Kingdom, and swans in Rhode 
Island, during the summer of 2008. Future human infection 
with viruses of both subtypes will likely continue to occur. 
It is clear that the study of avian influenza viruses (H5N1) 
has greatly improved our understanding of avian viruses. 
Applying this knowledge toward the assessment of other 
HPAI and LPAI viruses with pandemic potential, such as 
those within the H7 subtype, will further improve our abil-
ity to respond to and reduce the severity of future pandem-
ics, regardless of virus subtype.
Dr Belser is a microbiologist in the Influenza Division, Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention. Her research has focused 
on the molecular determinants that confer virulence and transmis-
sibility of influenza viruses, including subtype H7 viruses with 
pandemic potential.
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